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Vaclav Havel’s Levinas: Timely remarks on humanism 
 
Daniel Brennan 
 
Abstract 
The paper explores Václav Havel’s encounter with Emmanuel Levinas’ essay ‘Without Identity’, which Havel 
read while in prison. The discussion of this encounter will demonstrate the importance of this encounter for 
solidifying the humanist elements of Havel’s thought, whilst also demonstrating the pre-existing humanism in 
Havel, evidence itself of his large debt to Czechoslovak humanist thought. What emerges is a demonstration of 
the richness and timeliness of Havel’s writing on responsibility. The paper makes a case for rejecting popular 
Heideggerian interpretations of Havel’s oeuvre. Havel’s deep affinity for Levinas’ thinking demonstrates that 
Havel’s humanism, informed as it is from the Czech tradition as well as through his encounter with Levinas, is at 
odds with Heidegger’s essential anti-humanism. 
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Václav Havel first encountered the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas while in prison.1 He 
read a translation of the essay ‘Without Identity,’ made for him by his brother, Ivan.2 Havel 
was deeply affected by this encounter and the most philosophically rich of his letters to his 
wife Olga from prison are overtly meditations on this encounter (Havel, 1989). Levinas’ essay 
is a passionate defence of humanism. Levinas describes humanism as an “untimely 
consideration,” and by this untimely he means not that it is old or out of date; rather, it is 
lamentably, and to our detriment, unfashionable to be thinking positively about humanism 
(Levinas, 2006, p. 59).  
Levinas is writing of the French intellectual scene immediately after the May 1968 protests 
in Paris. Levinas is scathing of intellectual trends which, in Levinas’ view, were hindering the 
development of responsible humanist thought. For Levinas, these fashionable moments in 
thought are a part of a debased marketplace of ideas where the most charismatic voices are 
given court regardless of the implications of the ideas. The Parisian café is described by 
Levinas as beholden to “the tyranny of the latest craze” (Levinas, 2006, p. 59). In the essay’s 
closing remarks Levinas sets out the clash between the fashionable café ideas, and his own 
humanism. “The idea of a closed subjectivity that can’t close itself in – unto substitution – 
responsible for all others and, consequently, the idea of the defence of man understood as a 
defence of the man other than me, presides over what is called in our day the critique of 
humanism” (Levinas, 2006, pp. 68–69). 
Levinas is adamant that his humanism undercuts the detrimental, immoral and 
unfortunately fashionable anti-humanism of the time. For Havel though, and similarly for the 
majority of intellectuals of Central Europe, humanism is never under question. The pitched 
battle between anti-humanism and humanism that Levinas waged in Paris, was unnecessary in 
Prague. The youth in late socialist Czechoslovakia saw humanism as a counter to the terror 
they experienced at the hands of totalitarian politics. Havel, as a representative of the 
Czechoslovak dissident movement, is also representative of the humanist potential for ethical 
living hoped for by Levinas in the final stages of his essay.  
Thus it is worthwhile considering the encounter between the Levinas and Havel. What will 
emerge through this encounter is a rich engagement between Havel’s most philosophical
                                                          
1
 Havel was charged with the crime of subversion of the republic and remained in prison from 1979 until 1983. 
2
 The essay is published in the collection Humanism of the Other (Levinas, 2006, pp. 58–69). 
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 writing, and Levinas’ most enthusiastic endeavour. In the bigger picture, it is worthwhile 
exploring, through Havel, the kind of humanism that flourished amongst Czechoslovak 
dissidents, as that humanism avoids much of what is most problematic in the attacks on 
humanism, and the implications of such thinking, which are more prominent in philosophy 
further west. Where many French social thinkers saw humanism as a pathway to terror, under 
the real and present terror of late socialism, humanism, for Czechoslovak dissidents, was an 
idea that generated hope in dark times. 
Levinas’ essay was written in the wake of 1968’s social upheavals in Paris. The anti-
humanism that pervaded ‘popular’ theory of the time was usually couched in arguments for 
socialism. Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, de Beauvoir and others fused the anti-humanism of 
Heidegger’s position with their vision of a proletariat revolution (Judt, 1992, pp. 77–80). For 
example, for Merleau-Ponty, meaning was to be found in history, and as a consequence, if we 
are to be humanists, we must also be Marxists (Merleau-Ponty, 1969, p. 118). As Tony Judt 
describes it, French intellectuals were deeply attracted to violence and were similarly 
disinterested in morality as a category of public behaviour (Judt, 1992, p. 7). This is the 
problematic situation Levinas was responding to. 
This trend has, to an extent continued with many popular social thinkers from western 
European philosophy searching for radical alternatives to the current neoliberal world order 
(Sharpe, 2015, p.2). Many of these attempts are brim full of irresponsible calls for 
Messianism, martyrdom and theological revolution. Such social theory directly calls to mind 
the debased market of fashionable café ideas that Levinas derides (Levinas, 2006, p. 58). It is 
as if the failure of socialism to supply a morally sufficient alternative to capitalism has led to a 
situation where radical politics is the only possible address to the neoliberal state. Built into 
much of this theory is a wholesale rejection of the oft maligned concept of humanism. Anti-
humanism abounds as theorists note the manifold ways that hegemony and ideology form 
identity (Mouffe, 2004, p. 22). For these anti-humanists, humanitas is a long dead concept 
which was responsible for our horribly mistaken attempts to master the planet. Matthew 
Sharpe diagnoses the outlook of these anti-humanists: “[The enlightenment’s] baleful cultural 
hegemony has issued in a technological iron cage, gilded with a vacuously aestheticised 
public culture. The whole dispensation seemingly allows for no exit, short of the arrival of a 
radical Otherness or difference sufficiently recalcitrant to all knowable order to be able to 
offer… redemption” (Sharpe, 2015, pp. 2–3). The bulk of such theory originates in an 
encounter with mid-century French and German philosophy. Foucault and post-structuralism 
still dominates much contemporary thinking as the human has been argued to be ideologically 
created, even, through the idea of bio-power, down to the tiniest social behaviour. Heidegger 
through his poor reading of the history of philosophy has also demonstrated the inherent 
inability of the expression of Being in our epoch to ask the important questions which might 
arrest a slide towards nihilism. We are thus, from Heidegger’s view, in a sense doomed to our 
predicament. “Only a god can still save us” has come to mean that an entire epochal shift is 
required if our current nihilism is to be deflected (Heidegger 1966).  
It is thus a shame that especially in the Anglophone world, that intellectual debates 
regarding what has come to be called Continental philosophy, just slightly further to the East 
have largely been ignored. While France was, for the most part, turning its back on humanism 
after the earlier blind faith in socialism had revealed that reason was deficient for producing 
utopia, Central and Eastern European thinkers were revitalizing their understanding of 
humanism. The turn towards Heidegger and anti-humanism can be, not without controversy, 
dated to the assumed victory of Heidegger over Ernst Cassirer in a debate on the meaning of 
the human. As the Cassirer–Heidegger debate in Davos was widely seen as a win for the 
charismatic Heidegger, the positive reception of Heidegger flowed back into France. 
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Although Heidegger greatly influenced thinkers further East of Davos, it was not anti-
humanist thought which was reproduced. In Czechoslovakia, Jan Patočka, who, like Levinas, 
had studied under Heidegger, worked at first at bringing Husserl into Prague after his 
expulsion and then, after Husserl’s death, at preserving his archives (Kohak, 1989, pp. 9–10). 
Husserl had been led to philosophy in Vienna through the advice of his good friend Tomáš G. 
Masaryk. Masaryk, in central Europe, is a towering figure in intellectual and public history 
and, arguably, his most important contribution to thought is his unwavering philosophical 
faith in the virtues of humanist thought and the application of this thought for political life. 
Thus Czechoslovakia, unlike France, did not have a crisis of humanism. Stretching back to the 
renaissance, the thinking of Jan Amos Komenský begins a long pedigree of humanist writing.3 
Whereas in France, Levinas exasperatingly describes humanism as an idea “out of time”, 
in Prague, despite the risk to attendees, in underground and illegal meetings and samizdat 
publications, thinking citizens illuminated their dark times with humanist thought (Hajek, 
1992, p. 5). Thus it is worth considering the timeliness of their out of times humanism. In this 
paper I will start such a project with a consideration of Václav Havel, a student of Jan 
Patočka’s and admirer of Masaryk’s thought and example.  
Havel, interestingly, read Levinas while in prison from 1979–1983. His brother, Ivan, had 
made for him a translation of the essay, ‘Without Identity’ which is now published in the book, 
Humanism of the Other. This is his only stated encounter with Levinas’ thought (Kriseová, 
1993, p. 183). Despite the strong mark that Levinas’ thought left on Havel it is worth noting 
that Havel writes that throughout the reading he “was dogged by the feeling that [he’d] read it 
all somewhere before” (Havel, 1989, p. 314). Havel did not read Levinas as opening a new 
way to think about responsibility. Levinas, for Havel, articulates ideas which already are 
present in Czechoslovak debates. 
What follows is also interesting for students of Levinas, as Levinas’ biographer, Salomon 
Malka, is excited to have discovered that Havel had read Levinas, but he does not know 
which paper Havel actually read. The specific paper is important for understanding how 
Havel relates to Levinas. Furthermore, it is a common misconception that Havel is deeply 
indebted to the thinking of Martin Heidegger, especially regarding Heidegger’s critique of 
technology (Sire, 2001, p. 79; Pontusso, 2004, pp. 21–22; Tucker, 2000, p. 140). To the 
Anglophone world, Havel offers, ‘Heideggerian meditations’ when his writing takes on a 
philosophical tone. Through detailed of discussion of Havel’s encounter with Levinas it will 
be demonstrated that far from being a disciple of Heidegger, Havel at no point offers any 
analysis that can be said to fit into the anti-humanist philosophy of Heidegger. This is an 
important point, for although Havel did read Heidegger, unlike the French reception of 
Heidegger which could be said to be an apologist reception, Havel’s engagement goes no 
further than the borrowing of terminology. In most instances it can be shown that when Havel 
and Heidegger share a term, they mean different things by that term. 
It is hoped that through the exploration of Havel’s encounter with Levinas, that will 
necessarily entail further explorations into Havel’s inheritance of the humanist legacy from 
Masaryk and Patočka, that a robust debate of humanist ideas can again be seen as a valid 
response to any ‘crisis’ such as neoliberal political domination, or the Syrian refugee crisis.  
 
                                                          
3
 Jan Amos Komenský (lat. Johann Amos Comenius) was a 17th century philosopher interested, amongst other 
things, in the role that education could play in improving society. His idea of pan-sophia was a Baconian attempt 
to organize human knowledge to attempt omniscience. The reverence that Czech thinkers such as Havel, 
Masaryk and Patočka show to Komenský’s thinking reveals the rigorousness of public debate regarding 
humanism over the centuries. 
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Heidegger, the Red Herring 
In much of the scholarship treating Havel’s intellectual output it is widely accepted that Havel 
is heavily influenced by the thoughts of Martin Heidegger. Nothing could be further from the 
truth. In every way imaginable Havel’s thinking is at odds with Heidegger’s anti-humanist 
philosophy. For example, Havel’s most famous essay, ‘The Power of the Powerless’ is 
described by Avazier Tucker as an application of Heidegger’s discussion of “Being-in-the-
world as Being-with-oneself” (Tucker, 2000, p. 136). Thus Havel’s analysis of the actions of 
a greengrocer, who reflects on his adherence to the rules of the system in which he lives 
which ask him to hang a placard in his shop window, is, for Tucker, a Heideggerian attempt to 
show that blind adherence to ritualistic rules is symptomatic of ‘fallenness’ or ‘inauthenticity.’ 
In many ways this example is illustrative of the core of Havel’s humanist thinking and it is 
thus of vital importance to retort that the self-reflection of the greengrocer that reveals his/her 
complicity in affirming the system, and reveals his/her responsibility for withdrawing that 
complicity, does not at any level proclaim the epochal nature of thought. That is, the 
greengrocer, if he/she really were engaged in a Heideggerian act of thinking, would be taking 
note of his/her participation in historical Being. That is, he/she would see his/her very thought 
process as manifestly destined. Rather than revealing the potential for political change 
through an act of resistance, which is how Havel frames the reflection. The Heideggerian 
greengrocer engages in thought to see how unfree he/she is. What Tucker fails to understand 
is that for Havel, culture is the result of a creative free act. Havel’s analysis does not ever 
leave culture. The higher horizon which we are all responsible to, that will be explained in the 
next section, for Havel is not an escape from culture, but a call to direct culture to moral ends. 
That is, for Havel, being aware of our historicity is the same thing as being aware of how we 
should direct culture. 
Tucker does admit that Havel parts ways with Heidegger on the importance of ethics for 
authentic life (Tucker, 2000, p. 155). However, it would be better to say that Havel’s core 
project is essentially not compatible with Heidegger’s from the outset. This incompatibility 
can be demonstrated further if we consider Havel’s and Heidegger’s understanding of the 
term ‘throwness’. For Heidegger, the human subject is thrown into a situation in which it 
receives its meaning from historical Being (Heidegger, 2008, p. 192). Throwness is the 
receiving of destiny. In the early drafts of Being and Time, Heidegger describes Dasein as 
“taking orders”, “carrying out its reckoning and routine”, these submissively toned descriptors 
are what will become the description of throwness in the final version (Kisiel, 1995, p. 335). 
The use of the term throwness, in Havel, is something very different. When Havel writes of 
throwness he describes it in a way more familiar to readers of Levinas than Heidegger. “[T]he 
state of throwness into responsibility for another exists “before the ‘I’ itself”” (Havel, 1989, p. 
325). Havel continues to write that what the ‘I’ is thrown into and precedes the ‘I’. By this 
Havel is suggesting that there is a historical context into which a person is thrown. What is 
significant though is that the meaning of that situation is to be found in the ethical 
metaphysical relationship to the other, not from historical being itself.  
It is more prudent to consider Havel’s relationship to Heidegger through the lens of the 
Heidegger-Cassirer debate mentioned above. This important moment in the recent history of 
European philosophy sets out a line in the sand between traditional neo-Kantian humanism on 
the one hand, and Heidegger’s anti-humanism on the other. Havel was clearly not present at 
this event; however, on pure speculation I would suggest, against the Heideggerian 
interpretations of Havel’s oeuvre that he would have firmly sided with Cassirer. It is 
worthwhile making this speculation as Levinas deeply regretted his initial pronouncement of 
Heidegger’s victory. Richard Cohen suggests that this debate, and Levinas’ regret of his first 
impulse to side with Heidegger, is an illuminating way to read the entirety of Levinas’ post-
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debate publications. Cohen writes, “Levinas’s relation to Cassirer is not simply a matter of 
psychological interest. It has profound philosophical implications, especially for a proper 
conception of humanism and its responsibilities” (Cohen, 2006, pp. xxxvi–xxxvii). For Cohen, 
when Derrida criticizes Levinas’s project in ‘Violence et Metaphysique’ by linking it “by an 
ingenious dialectical violation to the very ontology he radically opposed,” Derrida misses the 
specific context of Levinas’ work (Cohen, 2006, p. xxxvii). For Cohen, Levinas’ project must 
be understood as working within Cassirer’s humanism, against Heidegger. The insight that 
Cassirer misses, Cohen argues, is the moral primacy of the other. This is not a mystical idea; 
it is deeply rooted in culture. In the terms, then, of the opposition between Cassirer and 
Heidegger, Havel, as an advocate of cultural change and responsibility, is more on the side of 
Cassirer, than Levinas.  
  
Havel’s Levinas 
Havel’s reading of ‘Without Identity’ solidifies much in Havel’s thinking. Levinas’ thoughts 
on the power of youth had a deep impact on Havel, who himself had thought, but not made as 
explicit, the potential power inherent in youth to reconstitute ethical living through a recovery 
of responsibility. Hence it is worth considering Levinas’ thoughts on youth and how they 
were understood by Havel. 
For Levinas, youth is a phenomenon and concept that belongs to what he terms the Saying, 
as opposed to the Said. The Saying and the Said are important concepts for Levinas’ ethics. It 
is quite difficult to give a full definition of each concept because, as is the case with most of 
Levinas’ writings, they are employed in a manner which invites meditation rather than tight 
understanding. This is, of course, the crucial element of Levinas’ project. Levinas rejects the 
idea of a stable, knowable reality which is accessible to the human subject. Attempts to 
explicate such a reality, for Levinas, represent the subject’s appropriation of otherness. That is 
any claim to understanding is also simultaneously a reduction of the other to the subject. 
Levinas thus attempts to wrestle language away from a discourse of clarity and understanding 
and instead tries to orientate discourse towards an ethical encounter with otherness. The 
Saying, thus, is that element of discourse which approaches the other as other. Therefore, the 
Saying is language stripped bare of presentation, demonstration and knowing (Levinas, 1974, 
p. 278). The Said entails the rest of language, the descriptive element of language which 
appropriates otherness. Colin Davis writes that for Levinas, the Saying is a primordial element 
of language. “Giving priority to the Said entails a failure to recognize another distinctive 
dimension of language, which Levinas calls Saying: underlying, though not fully represented 
by, every utterance is a situation, structure or event in which I am exposed to the Other as a 
speaker or receiver of discourse” (Davis, 1996, p. 75). Ethical living, can thus be said to be 
prioritizing the Saying – allowing responsibility to reveal itself in exposure to otherness. 
In ‘Without Identity’ the Saying is described through the adjective of ‘youth.’ Youth is 
described as a “rupture of the context” and as “coming from sincerity” where sincerity is the 
responsibility for others (Levinas, 2006, p. 69). Levinas’ musings on youth were inspired by 
the events of 1968. Levinas was deeply concerned at the way that the free and unformed spirit 
of youth was contained and reduced by the attractiveness of social theory, whose language, 
Levinas writes, was “just as wordy and conformist as the one it was supposed to replace” 
(Levinas, 2006, p. 69). Youth is the energy to contest the world of the Said. 
It is this understanding of youth which appeals to Havel. Havel writes, “I have always felt 
that the revolt of the young (in its expansive pre-ideological or pre-linguistic phase) was an 
extraordinarily important phenomenon” (Havel, 1989, p. 312). Havel’s own belief in the 
power of youth to upset ideological certainties is on vivid display five years prior to his 
reading of Levinas. In 1977 Havel, as well as many other dissident figures, became involved 
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in the trial of the band, The Plastic People of the Universe (PPU). It is important to note that 
Havel was not a fan of their music, even suggesting that they sacrificed listenability to be 
experimental (Havel, 1990, p. 126). Consequently, his involvement in the trial wasn’t as 
someone who identifies with the band. What Havel appreciates in the musical expression of 
PPU was in fact their otherness. If I import Levinas’ language to Havel’s involvement in this 
trial, I can say that Havel saw the band as giving expression to the Saying. Havel writes “Here 
was something serious and genuine, an internally free articulation of an existential experience 
that everyone who had not become completely obtuse must understand” (Havel, 1990, p. 126). 
For Havel, the compelling force of ideology had made many become obtuse. Havel is 
lamenting the way that ideological coercion slows down the authentic expression of youth. 
The Said of the PPU is a series of notes played on instruments; the Saying is their unbridled 
expression of existential identity – what Havel calls the “pre-linguistic” content of their music.  
Pre-linguistic expression which is the source of responsibility for Havel is a refusal to try 
to restrict meaning to a single consciousness’s understanding. In his 1969 play, The Increased 
Difficulty of Concentration, Havel provides an illustrative example of the poverty of 
descriptive language’s attempt to fix meaning to a single consciousness. The play’s central 
character, Huml, is dictating an essay on happiness to his secretary, Blanka. Huml makes 
grandiose statements full of philosophical vocabulary. He touches on the nature of justice, 
historical meaning, alienation, amongst other themes. However, he punctuates the dictation 
with awkward pauses where he asks Blanka to read back the most recent sentence. This is 
followed either by a request to delete a section, or a comment on the adequacy of the section. 
These pregnant pauses and re-writes add an element of uncertainty and absurdity to the 
meaning of the diction. 
 
Huml: ... – and thus attach to various things various values – full stop. Therefore, it 
would be mistaken to set up a fixed scale of values, valid for all people in all 
circumstances and at all times – full stop. This does not mean, however, that in all of 
history there exist no values common to the whole of mankind – full stop. If those 
values did exist, mankind would not form a unified whole – full stop... At the same time, 
an individual scale of values is always somehow related to other – more general – scales 
of values – for instance, to those belonging to a given period – which form a sort of 
framework, or background, to the individual scales – full stop. Would you mind reading 
me the last sentence? 
Blanka: (reads) ‘At the same time, an individual scale of values is always somehow 
related to other – more general – scales of values – for instance, to those belonging to a 
given period – which form a sort of framework, or background, to the individual scales 
– full stop. Would you mind reading me the last sentence?’ 
Huml: That’s pretty good. Let’s go on... (Havel, 1993, p. 140). 
 
The absurdity of Blanka reading the entire dictation back, including the request to read the 
last part back to Huml, I read as a critique of philosophical language. Huml’s diction sounds 
empty. He stands, on the stage, waxing lyrical about horizons of meaning, as if his secretary 
where an extension of his thoughts. That she does not intuit where the diction ends and the 
question directed to her begins is a signifier of the inability of the discourse to recognize her 
otherness – her role is to record all of Huml’s speech. To make this point another way, 
Huml’s speech about meaning being layered from a universal meaning to specific historical 
and cultural meanings is ironic insofar as the speech ignores the specific presence of Blanka’s 
experience. She is for Huml, an extension of his world view. This relationship is later 
challenged in the play when Huml expresses his desire for Blanka and she rejects his 
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advances. It is as if Huml assumed that Blanka had the same mindset as himself and he does 
not take her rejection very well. 
James Pontusso has located in the play a consideration of Heideggerian themes (Pontusso, 
2004, p. 96). I suggest they might be found in the above quoted section. Huml considers the 
possibility of human meaning being a product of historical destiny. This is clearly a 
Heideggerian notion; however, that consideration is punctuated by Huml’s failed attempts to 
seduce Blanka. Blanka reminds Huml of her otherness by exerting her autonomy to reject his 
advances. The picture painted is of the emptiness of Huml’s claim to know something about 
human happiness Huml’s is clearly a frustrated man. The result is an ironic consideration of 
Heidegger that could be considered analogous to Levinas’ critique of philosophical language. 
Huml’s diction aims at totality through the expression that ‘happiness = x’ yet the remainder 
that is unthought in the dictation – (Blanka’s disinterest, his mistaken estimation of her 
desire…) – shows that the attempt at totalizing meaning is unable to capture the infinity of 
reality. In other words, Huml’s dictation is an example of the Said having priority over Saying. 
His encounter with Blanka is not open to her otherness. To add to this, Huml is old, and 
comments on the youthfulness of Blanka. His blinkered vision of the situation might be 
considered a comment on the ‘obtuseness’ of age. 
Levinas’ biographer was surprised by Havel’s insight, upon reading ‘Without Identity’ that 
Levinas had clearly been in prison (Malka, 2006, p. 81). We need not be so surprised by 
Havel’s recognition of Levinas’ previous incarceration as what acts as a signpost to this for 
Havel is Levinas’ writing on the vulnerability of consciousness. Being open to the other is 
described by Levinas as being vulnerable (Levinas, 2006, p. 64). Davis describes Levinas’ 
philosophical endeavour as an attempt to make philosophy susceptible to what it has always 
suppressed (Davis, 1996, p. 33). In ‘Without Identity’, Levinas writes of his sense of his own 
vulnerability. This is vastly different to social theory he criticizes which posits the human as 
being formed by forces outside of itself (and thus being vulnerable to those forces) (Levinas, 
2006, p. 62). Vulnerability, which is akin to openness, is, for Levinas, the assumption for the 
responsibility of the other without having that responsibility reciprocated. It is passive 
acceptance of the other, as other, despite the wound to the ego that such passivity would entail 
(the wounding is a result of resisting the urge to understand and appropriate otherness).  
“No longer the essence of being that opens to show itself, not consciousness that opens to the 
presence of the essence open and confided in it. Opening is the stripping of vulnerability of a 
skin offered in wound and outrage beyond all that can show itself, beyond all that of essence 
of being can expose itself to understanding and celebration” (Levinas, 2006, p. 68). Levinas 
continues to describe vulnerability as the aptitude for being slapped. Levinas means that the 
other is a constant reminder of the limits of one’s freedom. I think it fair to suggest that 
Blanka’s rebuke of Huml’s advances, she even pushes him to the floor can be seen as a useful 
illustration of Levinas’ understanding of vulnerability. The irony is that Huml does not reflect 
on the rebuke, refusing to see that she is not interested, and later claiming that his problem 
was the timing of his advance. 
Vulnerability is a key theme of Havel’s Levinasian reflections in Letters to Olga. In 
reflecting on a strange moment he experienced while watching television, Havel describes the 
importance of Levinas for solidifying his thinking on responsibility and vulnerability. 
“Several days ago, during the weather report… something went wrong in the studio and the 
sound cut out, though the picture continued as usual (there was neither the announcement ‘Do 
not adjust your sets” nor landscape photographs, as there usually is in such cases). The 
employee of the Meteorological Institute who was explaining the forecast quickly grasped 
what had happened, but because she was not a professional announcer, she did not know what 
to do. At this point a strange thing happened: the mantle of routine fell away and before us 
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there suddenly stood a confused, unhappy and terribly embarrassed woman: she stopped 
talking, looking in desperation at us, then somewhere off to the side, but there was no help 
from that direction. She could scarcely hold back her tears. Exposed to the view of millions, 
yet desperately alone, thrown into an unfamiliar, unexpected and unresolvable situation, 
incapable of conveying through mime that she was above it all… she stood there in all the 
primordeal nakedness of human helplessness” (Havel, 1989, p. 322). In this anecdote Havel 
claims to have found a metaphor for the primal situation of humanity. Havel writes that he 
also suffered because he had no way to help her – he was reminded of his own helplessness, 
as well as his responsibility. For Havel the anecdote highlights what was of most value from 
his reading of Levinas – that is the idea that our responsibility precedes our freedom. 
In the example of the weather woman, the comfortable meanings of the Said are stripped 
away. Havel’s unformed and unexpressed anguish at his inability to help, the woman’s 
gestured appeal through the camera for assistance, the revelation of a primordial state of 
undetermined vulnerability, these are reminders of the infinity of Saying. Havel admits that on 
reflection, the weather woman’s suffering, in comparison to his own, is probably insignificant. 
She is a television presenter who would receive the benefits that come with that position, 
while he is in prison with an unknown release date. Yet before his thoughts solidify into a 
judgment on the situation Havel is clear that he still feels a primordial responsibility. That is 
to say, a detailed description of the situation comes after responsibility – Havel feels 
responsible before he feels that she is better off than he is. For Havel, feelings of compassion, 
love and a spontaneous desire to help others is prior to our own “speculative” concerns for our 
own welfare. Such a view is clearly a rejection of the idea that the Husserlian ego illuminates 
the given through intentional thought and far more akin to Levinas’ assertion that the proper 
role of philosophy is to go beyond the given to a prior state of ethical responsibility to others 
before they show themselves to consciousness. 
All of this is not to suggest that Havel and Levinas are a neat fit. There is much that Havel 
would not agree with in Levinas’ philosophy, and which he could have made explicit had he 
meditated on his differences between his position and that presented in ‘Without Identity.’ For 
example, in his Levinasian meditations, Havel writes that he agrees with Levinas’ idea that 
the I, in its throwness, is in a constant state of vulnerability, showing itself “helplessly and 
limitlessly” (Havel, 1989, p. 327). The ‘I’, vulnerable before the other and aware of its 
separateness from the other, must then become aware of its freedom (Havel, 1989, p. 327). 
For Havel, our freedom consists in the realization of the limits of our agency; in other words, 
we are free to realize what we can and cannot do. Through the realization of what we can do 
we become aware of our responsibility. Thus, for Havel, through the initial understanding of 
the primal orientation to ethical relationships between beings, thought shines light on what 
our responsibility to others is. That is, and this is crucial, for Havel, once we are aware of the 
necessary difference between beings, and the inherent limitations on action in any given 
moment, we are thus able to discern what the best way to act out our responsibility towards 
others is. Havel’s thought can thus be understood as attempting to derive political solutions to 
problems of responsibility. In this Havel is close to Cassirer’s point that once responsibility is 
made known it is possible to direct human culture towards rectifying issues of injustice. The 
same cannot be said for Levinas, for whom culture is less important than moral transcendence. 
Havel cannot go with Levinas all the way in this radical project. 
Havel writes that true responsibility doesn’t enter the mind until the mind establishes itself 
as an ‘I’ (Havel, 1989, p. 330). The establishing is an act of naming responsibility and 
bringing it from a timeless and limitless longing into a world confined by space and time. In 
this Havel betrays his debt to Czechoslovak humanism as an understanding of responsibility 
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as a simultaneous awareness of autonomy and the limits to that autonomy are found in the 
influential humanist thinking of T. G. Masaryk. 
 
Havel’s Czechoslovak Humanism 
The relative humanist thinking of T. G. Masaryk and Karel Čapek had a formative effect on 
Havel’s thinking. Paul Wilson, in his introduction to Letters to Olga, writes that Havel’s 
letters fit into a long line of Czech discourse between Czechs and Slovaks on the meaning of 
their nation. “This conversation… has a long history stretching back to the beginning of the 
modern Czech nation in the nineteenth century, when the language and culture were revived 
and re-created by several generations of patriotic artists, writers, composers, journalists, 
politicians and intellectuals who based their work on foundations laid by generations of 
ordinary people who had preserved and enriched the language orally” (Wilson in Havel, 1989, 
p. 11). Havel’s oeuvre can easily be said to fit into a larger Czechoslovak conversation about 
morality and culture. A small comparison of Havel’s work with that of the towering figure of 
Czech literature, Karel Čapek, will reveal Havel’s awareness of the canon (Čapek, 2010). 
Čapek together with Masaryk are two of the most prominent figures in public debate from the 
beginning of the Czech nation. Both offer a succinct humanism centred on furnishing public 
life with a moral heart; furthermore, both are concerned with utilizing culture to establish the 
moral foundations of the political. Hence, it is prudent here to show briefly Havel’s debt to 
these two thinkers as they will demonstrate where Havel and Levinas part ways. Havel will be 
shown to have more in common with Cassirer then either Levinas or Heidegger.  
In Čapek’s posthumously published letters to his wife, Listy Olze (Letters to Olga) there is 
an interesting moment which is quite similar to Havel’s anguish at his helplessness at 
watching the weather woman’s terror. Čapek writes that he had heard that Olga had been sick 
while he was away from Prague. His response to this news is analogous to Havel’s anguish. 
Čapek writes, “There you suffered, and I wasn’t with you! I’d like to cause myself some 
severe pain to know what it is like” (Čapek, 2010, p. 224). The significant feature of this 
desire to inflict pain on himself is that Čapek’s sentiment is full of empathy and a desire for 
greater empathy. Similarly, Havel’s anguish at being unable to help the weather woman is a 
moment of empathy. Empathy, for Levinas, is an appropriation of difference by the same. 
That is, for Levinas, empathy is problematic as it is a fallacy to claim that another’s 
experience can be suffered by oneself.  
Empathy is a vital component in the brand of humanism supported by Čapek. One of the 
most important organs for generating empathy is literature. Čapek contends that literature 
offers examples of the best of life. For Čapek life follows literature and the converse is only a 
half truth. The examples of living that literature shows offer glimpses at the potential of life to 
increase its flourishing (Čapek, 2010, pp. 6–7). What is important for Čapek was that literary 
criticism does not try to silence any form of literary expression. For Čapek it is vital that 
culture be allowed to consume whatever stories are created, whether deemed to be of value or 
not. This is a sentiment shared by Havel decades later.
4
 What is important to note is that the 
desire to promote the manifold means of expression has at its heart, not a Levinasian respect 
for absolute difference, but an attempt to generate more empathy through increased moral 
imagination. I am here only focused on the example of literature, but the example can be 
broadened to suggest that for Čapek and Havel, culture (of which literature is a component) is 
a means of generating moral relationships. 
                                                          
4
 Havel’s speech to the Union of Czechoslovak Writers, delivered on June 9, 1965, lambasted the union for 
privileging for publication literature which was not critical of the current political situation. Havel forcefully 
argues for a publication schedule of a wide array of non-ideologically motivated literature in order to give full 
access to possible literary expression of existential identity (Havel, 1992, pp. 10–35). 
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Čapek engaged in a series of interviews with Masaryk which was later published as a book 
(Čapek, 1995). In their conversation, Masaryk placed great emphasis on Children’s education 
through literature. Masaryk, like Havel and Čapek, believed in the reforming power of culture 
and consequently argued for a more relevant children’s literature that would grow children’s 
moral imaginations (Čapek, 1995, pp. 46–52). For Masaryk, the examples depicted in well-
crafted literature offer models for emulation. That is the reader understands something about 
the example and how it applies outside of the context of the book and they then emulate that 
example. Furthermore, for Masaryk, the examples of literature are conversation starters about 
acceptable behaviour and the possible directions for culture. These discussions around 
literature take on the force of directing culture to the most preferred possibility (Čapek, 1995, 
pp. 46–47). What is significant is the notion that a shared understanding between individuals, 
obtained through discourse is of paramount importance for morality. This is at odds with the 
thought of Levinas for whom culture is problematic. 
Simon Critchley in his book, The Problem with Levinas, argues that culture, for Levinas, is 
a source of bondage (Critchley, 2015, p. 38). Levinas indeed contends that the forms of 
cultural expression, prominent amongst the 1968 Parisian protesters, were not only deficient, 
but false and deceitful (Levinas, 2006, p. 69). For Critchley, Levinas sees the kind of cultural 
debates that I have presented above through Masaryk, Čapek and Havel, as an error of 
substituting aesthetic judgements in the place of true ethical thought. Critchley writes that for 
Levinas these judgements are degenerate forms of the ideal (Critchley, 2015, p. 39). The 
problematic depiction of the social sciences in ‘Without Identity’ is further evidence of this. 
For Levinas, culture spoiled the unformed truth that the youthful mind has access to. Whereas 
for Čapek, Masaryk, and Havel, there is a strong role for culture in forming the mind of the 
youth through the development of moral imagination which occurs through pluralistic literary 
expression. It is for these thinkers the role of culture to show the way to the ideal. Čapek, in 
his short journalistic piece ‘Where is Heaven?’ writes “[i]f you find sacredly blooming roses 
all around you, and a redeemed angel in every human, if everyone is a winged cherub for 
you… you’ll be in heaven” (Čapek, 2010, pp. 13-14). The point for Čapek is that heaven, (the 
ideal) is within the reach of life and that culture is the means of creating it. 
Ernst Cassirer, in a posthumously published critique of Heidegger, quotes the poetry of 
Schiller to demonstrate the importance of imagination for directing culture.  
 
But free from all the ravages of time… 
To soar on their wings 
Cast off dread of the earthly 
Flee from narrow, stifling life 
Into the realm of the ideal! (Schiller in Cassirer, 1982, p. 162). 
 
The promise of this poem, for Cassirer, is the possibility of the idea of “life in the idea” 
(Cassirer, 1982, p. 162). Cassirer is at pains in the critique to show the emptiness of 
Heidegger’s contention that culture and history are inauthentic, and that they sink Dasein in to 
the impersonal ‘they’. As is well known, Cassirer is considered to have lost the Davos debate. 
However, when we read Havel’s uptake of ideas from Masaryk and Čapek, we can note that 
the humanistic ideas of Cassirer have champions further east. 
 
Havel and Postmodern Ethics: the mark of Levinas 
Havel’s understanding of the moral foundations of politics owes a massive debt to the 
humanist thought of Masaryk. Masaryk himself was explicit about his engagement with the 
philosophy of Herder (Barnard, 1990, p. 23). There is, thus, an underlying acceptance in 
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Czechoslovakia that the history of western philosophy has not resulted in nihilism. The post-
structural moment, in France, which accepted uncritically Heidegger’s cherry picked 
interpretation of the history of western philosophy and the corresponding attack on humanist 
values, simply did not occur East of Germany. However, it is clear from the above analysis 
that it is not enough to suggest that Havel and Levinas, despite their differences, should be 
considered as totally different thinkers. The encounter that Havel has with Levinas thinking is 
also formative. Hence it is prudent, in the light of the above distinction of the similarities and 
differences, to spell out just how significant a moment the encounter was for Havel’s thinking 
after the encounter. A useful way for this will be to show some interesting points on which 
Havel diverges from his humanist forbears. 
In Humanistic Ideals, Masaryk summarizes his view of morality as follows: “Modern 
morality… is not founded upon anything which is new. An old and universally acknowledged 
law is its basis: “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.” Who, however, is my neighbor? We 
speak of the humanistic ideal. It has for me a dual sense. It means, in the first place, the ideal 
of manhood: be a man! Secondly, it entails consideration for our fellow humans in the widest 
sense” (Masaryk, 1971, p. 116). The obviously Christian understanding of morality is 
significant for understanding Havel’s position. Havel, for many scholars is a Christian thinker. 
He writes continually of being responsible to a higher power which judges him (Havel, 1990, 
p. 189). Yet there is, in Havel as well, an openness to non-Christian forms of understanding 
the higher horizon.  
An interesting section from the speech ‘The Need for Transcendence in a Postmodern 
World’ demonstrates how Havel differs from Masaryk. Havel writes that “the fewer answers 
the era of rational knowledge provides to the basic questions of human Being, the more 
deeply it would seem that people, behind its back as it were, cling to the ancient certainties of 
their tribe. Because of this, individual cultures, increasingly lumped together by contemporary 
civilization, are realizing with new urgency their own inner autonomy and the inner 
differences of others” (Havel, 1997, pp. 167–168). The points of specific interest relate to 
Havel’s acceptance of the idea that there is no certainty to be found in the moral world. Where 
I read Masaryk as entirely confident in his Christian faith, on the other hand Havel accepts 
that the appearance of the given is tainted by culture. However, Havel’s response is not to 
promote one cultural expression over another; Havel instead demonstrates the cogency in any 
thinking which privileges the ethical relationship of ‘I’ to the other (Havel, 1997, p.  168). 
That is, unlike the post-structuralists, Havel does not accept the postmodern position that a 
cultural interplay of forms of power is all there is; instead, Havel offers a view of 
responsibility heavily informed by his reading of Levinas that does not mimic Levinas as 
Havel still remains consistent with Czech humanism. The close relationship between the 
thinking of Havel and his mentor Jan Patočka, will demonstrate this. 
Writing of Havel’s mentor Jan Patočka, Petr Lom writes, “but how then is one to live 
according to truth, to care for the soul if one admits the basic historicity of man and the 
relativity of his orientation in the world? And why should this not lead either to despair or the 
abandonment of philosophy if one acknowledges that two thousand years of philosophy have 
not yielded incontrovertible certainties? Patočka’s answer is that contingency still does not 
foreclose the possibility of philosophy. For philosophy is rendered possible precisely by the 
phenomenological fact that we are able to distance ourselves from all that is given despite our 
contingency, a distancing that is always possible because we never experience the world in an 
incontrovertible, unequivocal manner” (Lom, in Patočka, 2002, p. xviii). The quote can be 
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applied to Havel just as easily considering Havel’s immersion in Patočka’s thinking.5 The key 
feature of thinking, for Havel, is the ability to call ourselves away from hegemonic ideology 
and reflect. What we reflect on, according to Havel is our natural and primal orientation 
towards the other, whom we are responsible for because of this orientation. This 
understanding of responsibility, common to Czech thinkers (and most prominent in the 
thinking of Patočka), is described by Martin Matuštík as “the birth of the responsible self 
freed from anonymous everydayness” (Matuštík, 2007, p. 51). 
Havel advocates a kind of thinking, which is very similar to Levinas’ attempt to make dark 
rather than illuminate the given. That is, by showing the mendacious foundation of any 
ideological position, Havel feels that he is able to show our primal and prior responsibility. 
“Transcendence as a deeply and joyously experienced need to be in harmony even with what 
we ourselves are not, what we do not understand, what seems distant from us in time and 
space, but with which we are nevertheless mysteriously linked because, together with us, all 
this constitutes a single world” (Havel, 1997, p. 172). It is important to point out that the 
“singularity of our world”, for Havel is not an entity that intellect can totalize. Like Levinas, 
Havel advocates a view of our world as a mysterious infinity rather than totality.  
Other thinkers have noted the post-modern relevance of Havel’s moral understanding of 
politics. Caroline Bayard sees in Havel’s plays, a similarity with the politically directed 
writing of Jean Francois Lyotard (Bayard, 1990, p. 291). Bayard praises Havel’s plays which 
suggest that in politics no discourse can have primacy over another. She notes that Havel’s 
dissidents in his plays are far less eloquent than are the ideologues, who promote the 
dominant ideology. Consequently, Havel’s dissidents promote an anti-ideology rather than 
promote a different ideology. Bayard’s point is that it is far better to oppose ideology in all its 
forms than to search for the ideology to replace the current one. With the above analysis in 
mind, Levinas is a far stronger candidate for comparison than Lyotard as the underlying 
reason that no discourse can have primacy over another, for Havel, is a Levinasian 
understanding that discourse can be an aggressive attempt to appropriate the other as the same.  
Richard Rorty focuses on Havel’s dissent against ideology in his paper, ‘The End of 
Leninism, Havel and Social Hope’ (Rorty, 1998, p. 243). Havel’s philosophy is pragmatically 
useful for Rorty as, in Rorty’s analysis, Havel is an advocate of social hope rather than hope 
requiring a metaphysical underpinning such as faith or history; in other words it is a 
groundless hope. Rorty has been taken to account for apparently misreading, or cherry picking, 
comments from Havel that advocate his view and ignoring ones which go against his 
pragmatic philosophy (Deneen, 1999, p. 652). Patrick Deneen writes that Rorty ignores the 
clear and blatant use of metaphysics to underscore any moral position in Havel. While it is 
true that Havel is no pragmatist, and that he does use, on occasion, metaphysical language, 
Havel, as Deneen concedes, does not explain his transcendent - it remains unsaid (Deneen, 
1999, p. 582). A position between Rorty’s and Deneen’s analysis is more appropriate. Havel 
does seem to offer a groundless metaphysics – other Czech thinkers, most prominently Karel 
Kosík, have claimed that Havel has dropped the mantle bequeathed to him from his 
intellectual forbears Masaryk and Patočka, insofar as Havel’s focus on concrete political 
problems made him lose sight of the importance of the ideal (Kosík, 1993, p. 154). However, 
this approach to Havel’s thinking misses not the positing of metaphysical certainty as Deneen 
presents, but rather the Levinasian critique of philosophy’s totalizing claims. Havel has 
philosophical faith in the undescribed and original ethical outlook.  
                                                          
5
 I have elsewhere written on the close similarities between Havel’s and Patočka’s thought (Brennan, 2014, pp. 
149–168). 
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On the other hand, Havel, as stated above, does not follow Levinas’ rejection of 
philosophy to the absolute limit. For Havel, Levinas inspires one to act, not only to reflect. 
That action is based on the reflection on responsibility. Deneen claims that Havel shares with 
John Dewey a sense of faith in the ability of man to transform society through his actions 
alone (Deneen, 1999, p. 607). He writes that our willingness to believe in the narratives which 
modern societies weave lends modern societies hope for improvement. On this he is right; but 
there is more to Havel’s faith in narratives then the hope they can offer. As Čapek and 
Masaryk also understood, a healthy and thriving culture explores plurality through art. Havel, 
after Levinas, aims for a global attempt at privileging the Saying over the Said. Czech-ness, 
European-ness or Western-ness, are all potentially mendacious identities which conceal a 
higher responsibility that the ‘I’ has to each and every human being. Havel writes, “it 
logically follows that, in today's multicultural world, the truly reliable path to coexistence, to 
peaceful coexistence and creative cooperation, must start from what is at the root of all 
cultures and what lies infinitely deeper in human hearts and minds than political opinion, 
convictions, antipathies, or sympathies - it must be rooted in self-transcendence” (Havel, 1997, 
p. 172). So, where Masaryk would have us comprehend “in a new light that which we already 
know”, Havel adds the caveat that the task of discerning something new begins from an 
uncertain infinity of responsibility. This is the aspect of Levinas which quickens Havel. 
Finally, the lack of post-structural theory’s presence in Prague is significant. Moral 
philosophy thrived in cities east of Paris. It is interesting that Derrida’s moral and political 
turn in his later works, such as Specters of Marx, and The Gift of Death, has been dated to his 
trip to Prague for the Jan Hus Foundation (Peeters, 2013, p. 341). Derrida was arrested, after 
police discovered drugs which had been planted on him. The experience of oppression at the 
hands of an oppressive regime had a formative effect on Derrida. It made him acutely aware 
of the impossibility of divorcing philosophy from politics as when one is oppressed 
everything is political. During this trip Derrida encountered the thinking of Jan Patočka, and 
this encounter forms the backbone of one of Derrida’s most obviously moral books, The Gift 
of Death. To make a simple point it took an encounter with Prague humanists to turn the 
Parisian philosopher’s attention to responsibility. Derrida’s thoughts on responsibility were, in 
a sense prefigured in Czechoslovak debates.  
Havel’s Levinas is interesting insofar as Havel willfully rejects one of the main thesis of 
Levinas’ thought – that a true ethical encounter with the other allows the other to remain 
wholly other. Havel instead sees that although the other is wholly other, the I must act in some 
way towards it. That is, I am compelled to not only allow the other to be other, but to also act 
responsibly towards it. Havel is all too aware that under certain political conditions the kind 
of meditative ethics put forward by Levinas are impossible. My actions will always impact on 
others so I had better make sure I am as responsible in my actions as I can be. Thus Levinas, 
for Havel supplies two key insights, firstly, I am always responsible for others, and secondly, 
that human life has a moral foundation. Thus Havel has a lot of time for Levinas’ thoughts on 
youth. Levinas’ youth is an analogy for an unformed energy to be responsible. Havel 
understands that one simply can’t avoid impacting on others. For Havel and Levinas the 
energy of youth is most desirous of the good world and has yet to be tainted by false 
hegemonies, and this energy is what philosophy should seek to maintain. 
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